CRISISTABLETOP
Clinical care setting representing participant safety during a trial
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COMMERCIAL LEGAL INCIDENT · CLINICAL SAFETY

RTSM Failure Causing Participant Deaths

A protocol amendment changes a complex dose algorithm. Reduced testing misses two defects, site warnings remain in the help desk, and participants continue receiving full-dose kits. A monitor identifies the pattern after serious adverse events. The defect spans countries and studies, two participants die, emergency troubleshooting compromises audit trails, regulators impose a hold, and a whistleblower alleges known risks and milestone pressure.

2.5 HRSuggested duration15Participant roles11Scenario stages
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EXERCISE PURPOSE

Examine the coordinated clinical, regulatory, quality, legal, vendor, insurance, disclosure, participant, family, and public response when trial software contributes to fatal dosing errors.

A safety-critical RTSM configuration and unit-conversion defect prevents required down-titration, causing dozens of incorrect doses, serious adverse events, participant deaths, a clinical hold, inspections, claims, and scrutiny of sponsor and vendor governance.

DECISION PRESSURE

Questions the team must answer together

The facilitator releases facts in stages. Participants should identify the decision owner, the authority being used, the information still needed, the immediate action, and the next escalation point.

01

Who can stop randomization, dosing, shipments, enrollment, or the entire study?

02

How will every affected participant, visit, kit, site, rule, and related study be identified?

03

What must be reported immediately before causality and root cause are final?

04

Can an emergency hotfix be trusted when troubleshooting damaged the audit trail?

05

What participant, family, regulator, vendor, insurer, board, and public response is appropriate after deaths?

INSIDE THE EXERCISE

A scenario that changes as the response develops

The template is already populated with public injects, facilitator-only context, discussion prompts, private role messages, and a final hotwash.

  1. Study startup
    Module 1 · Design and warning signs

    A complex dose-adjustment study goes live

    Ardentis Pharma begins a global, blinded Phase III oncology trial. The randomization and trial supply management system assigns treatment, selects kits, and adjusts dose by treatment arm, cycle, renal function, weight, laboratory results, toxicity, and prior dose. The RTSM vendor configured the protocol rules from a sponsor specification and connected the system to EDC, laboratories, depots, and site pharmacies.

  2. Month 4
    Module 1 · Design and warning signs

    A protocol amendment changes the dosing algorithm

    The protocol is amended after emerging safety data. Participants with specified renal-function or toxicity results must be down-titrated at the next visit. The vendor deploys a configuration update in four weeks. Requirements move through email, a spreadsheet, and a ticket. The release passes scripted testing and receives sponsor approval.

  3. Week 1 after release
    Module 1 · Design and warning signs

    Sites question unexpected kit assignments

    Pharmacists at two sites report that the RTSM assigned full-dose kits to participants they expected to receive reduced doses. The help desk says the assignments reflect the approved configuration and instructs sites not to unblind or override the system. Tickets are categorized as training questions and closed after sites confirm dispensing.

  4. Week 2 · Tuesday
    Module 1 · Design and warning signs

    A monitor finds a dosing pattern

    A clinical research associate compares source records with kit assignments and finds seven participants with qualifying renal or toxicity results who received full-dose kits. Several have adverse events that could be consistent with excessive exposure. The data review plan does not routinely reconcile laboratory thresholds against RTSM dose decisions.

  5. Tuesday · 15:00 UTC
    Module 1 · Design and warning signs

    The defect affects multiple rules

    Vendor engineers reproduce the error. A unit-conversion defect prevents renal down-titration for some laboratory feeds. A second configuration rule applies toxicity down-titration one cycle late. The vendor estimates that 34 participants received an incorrect dose, usually an overdose, across 19 sites in 8 countries. It cannot yet confirm whether the same reusable component affects other sponsor studies.

  6. Wednesday · 02:10 local time
    Module 2 · Fatalities and investigation

    Two participants die after unexpected toxicity

    Two affected participants die after severe complications consistent with excessive exposure. A third is in intensive care. Investigators report the events immediately, but treatment causality, disease progression, comorbidities, and the dosing defect must still be evaluated. Families ask whether the sponsor knew other participants received the wrong dose.

  7. Wednesday · 09:00 UTC
    Module 2 · Fatalities and investigation

    The audit trail is no longer complete

    During emergency troubleshooting, a vendor engineer changed a production rule and reran assignment logic against test copies of participant records. The change was not made through the validated release process. Some logs rolled over, and the engineer used a shared support account. The vendor proposes a hotfix that it says will correct future assignments within hours.

PARTICIPANTS

Bring the decision-makers who would own the real event

Assign people to functions, not titles alone. If one person owns several functions, keep the roles distinct during discussion so conflicts and handoffs remain visible.

Incident CommanderChief Medical and Patient Safety OfficerPharmacovigilance LeadClinical Operations LeadClinical Quality and GCP LeadRegulatory Affairs LeadRTSM Product and Engineering LeadInvestigational Product Supply LeadInvestigator and Site Pharmacy LiaisonGeneral CounselCommercial Legal LeadFinance and Insurance LeadCommunications and Family LiaisonBoard and Audit Committee LiaisonExecutive Sponsor

REAL-WORLD INCIDENTS

Ground the exercise in events teams can recognize

Use these cases during planning or the prebrief. They are factual anchors, not scripts. Adapt the scenario to the organization’s technology, industry, geography, contracts, regulators, and risk profile.

LEGAL, REGULATORY & STANDARDS LENS

Authorities worth testing against the scenario

Applicability depends on the organization and facts. Use counsel and subject-matter owners to tailor deadlines, thresholds, privileges, preservation, reporting, and communications.

PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVES

Law-firm and security-professional guidance

External perspectives help the design team challenge internal assumptions. They do not replace organization-specific legal or technical advice.

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Finish with an improvement plan, not a score.

  • Independent controls over safety-critical trial technology
  • A rapid participant identification and clinical-support process
  • Mapped fatal safety, serious-breach, ethics, hold, and inspection duties
  • A preserved and reconstructable system and decision record
  • Root-cause CAPA across sponsor, vendor, process, contract, and governance
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